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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Despite Respondent's allegation that the appropriate standard 
of review in this case is the "substantial evidence" test, 
Petitioner's challenge is not to the facts but rather to legal 
issues. The primary issue in this case is the application of the 
so-called "odd-lot" doctrine and that issue is one of law, which is 
to be reviewed under the "correction of error" standard without any 
deference to the agency's view of the law being required. Utah 
Administrative procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-
16(4) (d) (1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 
328 (Utah 1991). Morton Int'l., Inc. v. Auditing Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971) is the 
determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the 
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The primary issue on appeal is Mr. Jackson's entitlement to 
workers' compensation benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. As a 
result of an industrial injury, Mr. Jackson is no longer able to be 
employed in any well-known branch of the labor market. Although he 
undeniably had other medical problems, the industrial injury was 
the "straw which broke the camels back." Following his industrial 
injury he was unable to perform any meaningful work. Due to 
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advanced age, limited education and other health problems he was 
not a suitable candidate for vocational rehabilitation. He is a 
classic "odd-lot" doctrine case. Respondents have misconstrued 
Petitioner's Social Security file which is replete with references 
to his back on a sourse of his disability. 
Respondents fail to meaningfully address the application of 
the "odd-lot" doctrine to the facts of this case. The vast bulk of 
the arguments in Respondent's Brief become totally irrelevent and 
immaterial once the "odd-lot" doctrine is applied. This Court 
should summarily reverse the Industrial Commission's final agency 
action by ruling that Mr. Jackson was entitled to the presumption 
afforded by the "odd lot" doctrine, and it was not rebutted as a 
matter of law in this case. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD LOT" 
DOCTRINE TO PETITIONER'S PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY 
CLAIM, AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A PRESUMPTION OF 
ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED, 
In his original Brief, Petitioner argued that he was entitled 
to permanent, total disability benefits under the "odd-lot" 
doctrine. This argument was made before the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission and the presumption of 
entitlement was never rebutted. Respondents on appeal have also 
largely ignored this primary and compelling basis for an award of 
benefits. 
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In order to fully appreciate the application of the "odd-lot 
doctrine it is helpful to understand it's development and the 
factual context to which it has been applied. 
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE. 
Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-lot11 
doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 1 KB 
1009 (1911): 
There are cases in which the burden of shewing suitable 
work can in fact be obtained does fall up the employer. 
[If]...the capacities for work left to him fit him only 
for special uses and do not .. . make his powers of labour 
a merchantable article in some well known lines of the 
labor market....[I]t is incumbent upon the employer to 
shew that such special employment can in fact be obtained 
by him...flf1 the accident leaves the workman's labour in 
the position of an "odd-lot" in the labor market, the 
employer must shew that a customer can be found who will 
take it.... (Emphasis added). 
Judge Cordozo very early in the history of workmen's 
compensation in the United States, set the policy for odd-lot 
determination: 
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his 
request for employment with notice that labor must be 
light. The applicant imposing such conditions is quickly 
put aside for more versatile competitors. Business has 
little patience with the suitor for ease and favor. He 
is the ' odd-lot' man, the nondescript in the labor 
market. Work, if he gets it, is likely to be casual and 
intermittent...Rebuff, if suffered, might reasonably be 
ascribed to the narrow opportunities that await the sick 
and halt. Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E. 635, 636 
(N.Y. App. 1921). (Emphasis added). 
Professor Larson in his oft cited treatise on workmen7s 
compensation law describes this doctrine, as follows: 
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in 
virtually every jurisdiction, total disability may be 
found in the case of workers who, while not altogether 
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will 
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not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the 
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable 
dependability with which claimant can sell his services 
in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such 
factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or fiends, temporary good luck, or the 
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his 
crippling handicaps. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1992). (footnotes 
omitted). (Emphasis added). 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN UTAH. 
The "odd-lot" doctrine has been accepted and favorably applied 
by the Utah Courts. One of the first modern Utah cases applying 
the doctrine was Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc., 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1980) were the injured worker had spent thirty years as a truck 
driver. In August of 1975, he injured his back in a non-industrial 
accident which led to surgery later that year. In October, 1916, 
he had recovered sufficiently to return to his job as a truck 
driver. He subsequently reinjured his back in the course and scope 
of his employment and in 1977 again underwent surgery on his back. 
Several months later, however, he re-injured his back in another 
non-industrial accident and was thereafter unable to return to 
work. 
The Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered from a 
30% permanent partial impairment, half of which was attributable to 
the industrial injury, and half of which was attributable to 
nonindustrial causes. Mr. Brundage was awarded permanent partial 
impairment benefits, but his claim for permanent total disability 
was denied. 
In reversing the Industrial Commissions' ruling regarding 
permanent total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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In his treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
Professor Arthur Larson states: 
'total disability' in compensation law is not 
to be interpreted literally as utter and 
abject helplessness.,.. The task is to phrase 
a rule delimiting the amount and character of 
work a [person] can be able to do without 
forfeiting his totally disabled status. 2 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 
57.51 at 10-107 (1992). 
Consonant with the view expressed by Larson, the 
Supreme Court has adopted the following definition of 
total disability: 
This Court has recognized the principle that a 
workman may be found totally disabled if by 
reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or 
any other work which a \person1 of his 
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to 
do. . . . United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964). 
(Emphasis added). 
The next important decision was Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 
495 (Utah 1981) . Mr. Wilkins, who was 55 years old, at the time of 
his industrial injury, sold trailers and other types of 
recreational vehicles which required him to travel throughout the 
west contacting dealers. In 1977 he suffered an industrial injury 
to his back while on a business trip when he slipped and struck his 
back on some large rocks while attempting to unhitch a trailer. He 
was off work for some time while undergoing physical therapy, and 
although he later returned to light duty, he was eventually unable 
to continue because of pain. In defining the term "total 
disability" the Court stated as follows: 
...'total disability7 does not mean a state of abject 
helplessness or that the injured employee must be unable 
to do any work at all. The fact that an injured employee 
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may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional 
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total 
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation 
in which he was injured. His temporary disability may be 
found to be total if he can no longer perform the duties 
of the character required in his occupation prior to his 
injury. Id at 498. (citations omitted). (Emphasis 
added). 
The "odd-lot" doctrine was next considered in the monumental 
case of Marshall v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 681 P. 2d 208 
(Utah 1984). The Applicant was employed by Emery Mining Company as 
a maintenance mechanic in a coal mine. While leaving the mine in 
the back of a tractor-trailer, he was bounced up and down on the 
seat causing an injury to his back. After several months of 
conservative medical treatment, Mr. Marshall underwent surgery. 
Following surgery he was advised by his doctor that he could not 
return to work. Mr. Marshall was 67 years of age at the time. 
The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent 
partial impairment compensation finding he sustained a 10% whole 
body permanent, partial impairment due to the industrial accident 
and 15% due to pre-existing conditions. However, the Commission 
refused his request for permanent total disability stating the 
primary reason he was unable to return to work was his age. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission 
ruling that Mr. Marshall was entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
The Court defined permanent total disability as follows: 
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of 
the disability resulting from his injury he cannot 
perform work of the general character he was performing 
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when injured, or any other work which a man of his 
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to do....681 
P.2d at 211. (Emphasis added). 
The Court further stated: 
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms 
of the specific individual who has suffered a work-
related injury. An injury to a hand would not cause the 
same degree of disability in a teacher, for example, as 
it would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing the loss 
of earning capacity, a constellation of factors must be 
considered, only one of which is the physical impairment. 
Other factors are age, education, training and mental 
capacity. It is the unique configuration of these 
factors that together will determine the impact of the 
impairment on the individuals earning capacity. Id. at 
211. (citations omitted). 
Some employees, however, cannot be rehabilitated and 
even though not in a state of abject helplessness ' can 
no longer perform the duties . . . required in [their] 
occupation[s].' These employees fall into the so-called 
'odd-lot' category... Whether or not an employee falls 
into the odd-lot category depends on whether there is 
regular, dependable work available for the employee who 
does not rely on the sympathy of friends or his own super 
human efforts. Once the employee has presented evidence 
that he can no longer perform the duties required in his 
occupation and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the 
burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence of 
regular, steady work that the employee can perform, 
taking into account the employee's education, mental 
capacity and age.... 'It is much easier for the 
[employer] to prove the employability of the [employee] 
for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to 
prove the universal negative of not being employable at 
any work.' Id at 212-213. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd-lot 
cases are concerned with employees whose work involved physical 
labor, were 50 years of age and older, and had moderate or little 
education, similar to the Petitioner herein. Id. at 212. 
In Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 
(Utah 1986) , the Plaintiff, who was sixty years old with a limited 
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education and even more limited work background, suffered a 
fractured skull when a steel beam fell and stuck him on the head. 
A Medical Panel found that he had a 25% whole body permanent, 
partial impairment, with 15% being related to the industrial injury 
and 10% being related to pre-existing conditions. He requested 
permanent, total disability benefits based on his overall physical 
impairment, as well as his age and lack of education and skills. 
Despite the request, the Industrial Commission awarded only 
permanent, partial impairment compensation. 
In finding that the Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case 
of permanent, total disability, the Court stated, as follows: 
The Commissions findings failed to acknowledge the odd-
lot doctrine accepted in most jurisdictions and which has 
been repeatedly approved by this Court. That doctrine 
recognized the substantial difference between physical 
impairment and disability. For example, a low percentage 
of physical impairment is not per se less than total 
permanent disability. Numerous other courts applying the 
odd-lot doctrine have found permanent total disability 
despite a deceptively low percentage of physical 
impairment.... The odd lot doctrine further requires an 
evaluation of disability in terms of the specific 
individual who has suffered work-related injury.... 
Absent proof of employment reasonably available to one in 
the odd-lot category, the injured employee should be 
classified as totally disabled. Id. at 1326-1327. 
(Citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
In Norton v. Industrial Commission. 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986), 
decided shortly after the Hardman case, the Supreme Court 
reiterated it's holding in Hardman, and stated as follows: 
As in Hardman,... the Commission again failed in this 
case to carry out its tasks. It adopted with slight 
modification the findings of impairment reported by the 
medical panel but then failed in its administrative 
responsibility and function to evaluate Norton's 
< permanent disability which should have included such 
factors as Norton's 'present and future ability to engage 
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in gainful activity' as it is affected by such diverse 
factors as age, sex, education, economic and social 
environment, in addition to the definite medical factor-
permanent impairment. Id. at 1027. 
* * * 
Upon remand the Commission is required to address 
Norton's disability in light of all factors mentioned 
ante, and the burden will be on the employer to prove the 
existence of regular, steady work that Norton could 
perform, taking into account his age, limited education 
and functional illiteracy as well as his disabling pain. 
Id. at 1028. (Emphasis added). 
In Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co. , 748 P. 2d 572 (Utah 
1987) , the injured worker was employed as an industrial maintenance 
mechanic for the defendant. He suffered two industrial injuries 
which together resulted in a permanent partial impairment of 12% on 
a whole body basis. Following surgery, he returned to work with 
light duty restrictions. He retired approximately one year latter 
at age 65 and at that time requested that he be awarded permanent, 
total disability compensation. Although the Administrative Law 
Judge approved permanent total compensation, the Industrial 
Commission reversed. 
The Utah Supreme Court overruled the Industrial Commissions 
decision and reinstated the Administrative Law Judged ruling, 
citing approvingly the Norton, Marshall and Hardman decisions. 
Finally, in the recent case of Zimmermann v. Industrial 
Commission, 785 P.2d 1127, (Utah App. 1989) the Court reinterred 
that: 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 'odd lot doctrine' 
which allows the Commission to find permanent total 
disability when a relatively small percentage of 
a 
impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined 
with other factors to render the claimant unable to 
obtain employment. Id. at 1131. (citations omitted). 
* * * 
Hardman sets forth the following steps for 
qualification under the 'odd-lot' doctrine: 
(1) the employee must prove that he or she can 
no longer perform the duties required in his 
or her occupation; (2) the employee, having 
been referred to the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission, 
must, through cooperation with the Division, 
establish that he or she cannot be 
rehabilitated; and (3) the burden then shifts 
to the employer to prove the existence of 
steady work the employee can perform, taking 
into account several factors, including the 
employee's education, mental capacity, and 
age. Id. at 1131. (citations omitted). 
(emphasis added). 
C. APPLICATION OP PACTS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE ODD-LOT 
DOCTRINE. 
As initially stated in Hardman and clarified in Zimmermann 
there are three steps required for the application of the odd-lot 
doctrine: (1) the employee must prove that he can no longer perform 
the duties required in his or her occupation; (2) the employee must 
prove that he cannot be rehabilitated; and (3) the employer then 
has the burden to prove the existence of regular, steady work the 
employee can perform. If the employer can not do so, the injured 
worker is entitled to permanent, total disability compensation as 
an "odd-lot" injured worker. 
A review of each of those elements discloses that they are all 
satisfied in this case. 
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1. Inability to perform the duties required in his 
occupation. 
Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission spend a lot of time attempting to prove that it was Mr. 
Jackson's pulmonary condition which prevented his return to work; 
however, for the purpose of the "odd-lot" doctrine medical 
causation is irrelevant. The only relevant issue at this stage is 
whether Mr. Jackson could continue to perform the type of work that 
he was performing prior to being injured. None of the parties 
seriously argue that Mr. Jackson can return to work in the 
underground coal mines. At the time of the Administrative Law 
Judges decision Mr. Jackson was a 74 year old man who had not 
worked in nineteen years. (R. at 40). 
Mr. Jackson did in fact attempt to return to work several 
times in the year following his industrial injury, but was unable 
to work more than three or four weeks at a time which precipitated 
his work termination by his employer. He estimated that he only 
worked about 4-1/2 months after his accident which is certainly not 
a successful return to work. (R. at 40) . Mr. Jackson stated that 
pain in his back and legs made working in "low coal" difficult. 
(R. at 40) . The Utah Supreme Court in Norton, supra. held as 
follows: 
Provided that worker's disability was also analyzed with 
the framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case law dealing 
with the factor of substantial pain has general held that 
'[a] worker who cannot return to any gainful employment 
without suffering substantial pain is entitled to 
compensation benefits for total disability.' (citations 
omitted). 
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Mr, Jackson further testified that Dr. Smoot had "totaled him 
out" and rendered him permanently unable to work. (R. at 40) . 
That testimony was uncontroverted. The Administrative Law Judge 
found that he had not worked for 19 years. (R. at 41) . It is 
undisputed that Mr. Jackson never returned to work, and applied, 
the month after his work termination, for Social Security total 
disability benefits. His Social Security disability award 
determined that he had been unable to work as of April 24, 1973, 
the date he last worked following his sporadic work history after 
his 1972 industrial injury. (R. at 216-220). 
2. INABILITY TO BE REHABILITATED. 
Due to the Industrial Commissions finding that Mr. Jackson 
had failed to establish the necessary causation between his 
impairment and his industrial accident, a rehabilitation evaluation 
was not ordered. Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that in 
light of his health, age and education that Mr. Jackson could be 
rehabilitated. 
Mr. Jackson's Order granting Social Security disability 
benefits in 1982 made the following relevant findings: 
5. The claimant cannot perform his past relevant semi-
skilled work as a cutting machine operator and as a 
roof bolter. 
6. The claimant is of advanced age, with a limited 
education with no readily transferable skills. 
7. Based on his maximum sustained work capability, 
age, education and work experience, the claimant 
continues to be disabled. (R. at 220). 
The evidence is clear and overwhelming that following his 
industrial injury Mr. Jackson could not be rehabilitated for 
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meaningful and sustained employment. 
3. EXISTENCE OF REGULAR, STEADY WORK THE EMPLOYEE CAN 
PERFORM. 
Once the injured worker has satisfied elements (1) and (2) 
above, the burden then shifts to the employer to prove the 
existence of steady work the employee can perform, taking into 
account several factors, including the employee's education, mental 
capacity, and age. Hardman, at 1327. The Respondent employer has 
not made even a pretence of making such a showing. This failure 
undoubtedly resulted from the fact that in this case such a burden 
simply could not be met. Given Mr. Jackson's advanced age, severe 
health problems and limited education, there is simply no steady 
work he can now perform. 
Therefore, Mr. Jackson has established his entitlement to 
permanent, total disability as an "odd lot" injured worker. The 
presumption inherent in that doctrine has not been rebutted as a 
matter of law and an appropriate award of benefits should be 
issued. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its November 3, 1992 
Order dismissing Mr. Jackson's claim for permanent, total 
disability benefits for lack of medical causation. Mr. Jackson is 
entitled to benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
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Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award 
him permanent, total disability benefits based on the 
uncontroverted facts and medical evidence presented, 
DATED this 28th day of May, 1993 
D; 
14 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 
28th day of May, 1993 to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
201 South Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-208 
Mr. Earl C. Jackson 
Post Office Box 645 
East Carbon, Utah 84520 
File 
(1 original & 7 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(1 copy) 
(1 copy) 
VIRGflj»«5nDABNEY, ES<] 
A t t o r n e y f o r P e t i t i o n e r 
15 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A; Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1971). 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability benefits—Vocational rehabilitation 
—Maximum benefit. 
In cases of permanent total disability the award shall be 60% of the 
average weekly wages for five years from date of injury, and thereafter 
45% of such average weekly wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $54 
per week and not less than $29 per week, plus $5 for a dependent wife 
and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children; provided, however, that 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay more than $24,648; and provided further, that 
a finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceed-
ings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation 
under the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall 
be the duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabili-
tation division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, 
not to exceed $890 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that such em-
ployee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation 
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that 
there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 45% of 
his average weekly earnings, but not to exceed $54 per week, out of that 
special fund provided for by section 35-1-68, for such period of time be-
ginning with the time that the payments (as in this section provided) 
to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and end-
ing with the death of the employee. No employee, however, shall be en-
titled to any such payments if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and now receiving compensation benefits from the special fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68 shall be paid compensation benefits at 
the rate of $44 per week. This section shall apply to all persons perma-
nently and totally disabled who are now receiving or hereafter become 
entitled to receive compensation benefits from the special fund. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and there-
upon the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an oppor-
tunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding 
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according 
to the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent 
total disability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, 
however, and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where 
there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon par-
tial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind including loss of function, in 
excess of $24,648. 
